Drug Induced Homicide In

Alaska

In an effort to combat the rising tide of fatalities, many states have implemented Drug Induced Homicide laws to hold drug dealers accountable for the deaths.

Fortunately, Alaska is one of those states. The following is an excerpt from Alaska State Law:

Alaska Stat. § 11.41.120. Manslaughter

 (a) A person commits the crime of manslaughter if the person

     (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes the death of another person under circumstances not amounting to murder in the first or second degree;

     (2) intentionally aids another person to commit suicide; or

     (3) knowingly manufactures or delivers a controlled substance in violation of AS 11.71.010 — 11.71.030 or 11.71.040(a)(1) for schedule IVA controlled substances, and a person dies as a direct result of ingestion of the controlled substance; the death is a result that does not require a culpable mental state; in this paragraph, “ingestion” means voluntarily or involuntarily taking a substance into the body in any manner.

 (b) Manslaughter is a class A felony.

Alaska Stat. § 12.55.125. Sentences of imprisonment for felonies
Effective: 11/26/17  –  Through: 12/31/18

 (a) A defendant convicted of murder in the first degree or murder of an unborn child under AS 11.41.150(a)(1) shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of at least 30 years but not more than 99 years. A defendant convicted of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of 99 years when

     (1) the defendant is convicted of the murder of a uniformed or otherwise clearly identified peace officer, firefighter, or correctional employee who was engaged in the performance of official duties at the time of the murder;

     (2) the defendant has been previously convicted of

          (A) murder in the first degree under AS 11.41.100 or former AS 11.15.010 or 11.15.020;

          (B) murder in the second degree under AS 11.41.110 or former AS 11.15.030; or

          (C) homicide under the laws of another jurisdiction when the offense of which the defendant was convicted contains elements similar to first degree murder under AS 11.41.100 or second degree murder under AS 11.41.110;

     (3) the defendant subjected the murder victim to substantial physical torture;

     (4) the defendant is convicted of the murder of and personally caused the death of a person, other than a participant, during a robbery; or

     (5) the defendant is a peace officer who used the officer’s authority as a peace officer to facilitate the murder.

 (b) A defendant convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, solicitation to commit murder in the first degree, conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, kidnapping, or misconduct involving a controlled substance in the first degree shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of at least five years but not more than 99 years. A defendant convicted of murder in the second degree or murder of an unborn child under AS 11.41.150(a)(2) – (4) shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of at least 15 years but not more than 99 years. A defendant convicted of murder in the second degree shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of at least 20 years but not more than 99 years when the defendant is convicted of the murder of a child under 16 years of age and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant (1) was a natural parent, a stepparent, an adoptive parent, a legal guardian, or a person occupying a position of authority in relation to the child; or (2) caused the death of the child by committing a crime against a person under AS 11.41.200 – 11.41.530. In this subsection, “legal guardian” and “position of authority” have the meanings given in AS 11.41.470.

 (c) Except as provided in (i) of this section, a defendant convicted of a class A felony may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years, and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155 — 12.55.175:

     (1) if the offense is a first felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (2) of this subsection, three to six years;

     (2) if the offense is a first felony conviction and the defendant

          (A) possessed a firearm, used a dangerous instrument, or caused serious physical injury or death during the commission of the offense, five to nine years; or

          (B) knowingly directed the conduct constituting the offense at a uniformed or otherwise clearly identified peace officer, firefighter, correctional employee, emergency medical technician, paramedic, ambulance attendant, or other emergency responder who was engaged in the performance of official duties at the time of the offense, seven to 11 years;

     (3) if the offense is a second felony conviction, eight to 12 years;

     (4) if the offense is a third felony conviction and the defendant is not subject to sentencing under (l) of this section, 13 to 20 years.

 (d) Except as provided in (i) of this section, a defendant convicted of a class B felony may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years, and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155 — 12.55.175:

     (1) if the offense is a first felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (2) of this subsection, zero to two years; a defendant sentenced under this paragraph may, if the court finds it appropriate, be granted a suspended imposition of sentence under AS 12.55.085;

     (2) if the offense is a first felony conviction, the defendant violated AS 11.41.130, and the victim was

          (A) a child under 16 years of age, two to four years; or

          (B) was 16 years of age or older, one to three years;

     (3) if the offense is a second felony conviction, two to five years;

     (4) if the offense is a third felony conviction, four to 10 years.

 (e) Except as provided in (i) of this section, a defendant convicted of a class C felony may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than five years, and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155 — 12.55.175:

     (1) if the offense is a first felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (4) of this subsection, zero to two years; a defendant sentenced under this paragraph may, if the court finds it appropriate, be granted a suspended imposition of sentence under AS 12.55.085, and the court may, as a condition of probation under AS 12.55.086, require the defendant to serve an active term of imprisonment within the range specified in this paragraph;

     (2) if the offense is a second felony conviction, one to four years;

     (3) if the offense is a third felony conviction, two to five years;

     (4) if the offense is a first felony conviction, and the defendant violated AS 08.54.720(a)(15), one to two years.

 (f) If a defendant is sentenced under (a) or (b) of this section,

     (1) imprisonment for the prescribed minimum or mandatory term may not be suspended under AS 12.55.080;

     (2) imposition of sentence may not be suspended under AS 12.55.085;

     (3) imprisonment for the prescribed minimum or mandatory term may not be reduced, except as provided in (j) of this section.

 (g) If a defendant is sentenced under (c), (d), (e), or (i) of this section, except to the extent permitted under AS 12.55.155 — 12.55.175,

     (1) imprisonment may not be suspended under AS 12.55.080 below the low end of the presumptive range;

     (2) and except as provided in (d)(1) or (e)(1) of this section, imposition of sentence may not be suspended under AS 12.55.085;

     (3) terms of imprisonment may not be otherwise reduced.

 (h) Nothing in this section or AS 12.55.135 limits the discretion of the sentencing judge except as specifically provided. Nothing in (a) of this section limits the court’s discretion to impose a sentence of 99 years imprisonment, or to limit parole eligibility, for a person convicted of murder in the first or second degree in circumstances other than those enumerated in (a).

 (i) A defendant convicted of

     (1) sexual assault in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, or sex trafficking in the first degree under AS 11.66.110(a)(2) may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 99 years and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155 — 12.55.175:

          (A) if the offense is a first felony conviction, the offense does not involve circumstances described in (B) of this paragraph, and the victim was

               (i) less than 13 years of age, 25 to 35 years;

               (ii) 13 years of age or older, 20 to 30 years;

          (B) if the offense is a first felony conviction and the defendant possessed a firearm, used a dangerous instrument, or caused serious physical injury during the commission of the offense, 25 to 35 years;

          (C) if the offense is a second felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (D) of this paragraph, 30 to 40 years;

          (D) if the offense is a second felony conviction and the defendant has a prior conviction for a sexual felony, 35 to 45 years;

          (E) if the offense is a third felony conviction and the defendant is not subject to sentencing under (F) of this paragraph or (l) of this section, 40 to 60 years;

          (F) if the offense is a third felony conviction, the defendant is not subject to sentencing under (l) of this section, and the defendant has two prior convictions for sexual felonies, 99 years;

     (2) unlawful exploitation of a minor under AS 11.41.455(c)(2), online enticement of a minor under AS 11.41.452(e), or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit sexual assault in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, or sex trafficking in the first degree under AS 11.66.110(a)(2) may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 99 years and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155 — 12.55.175:

          (A) if the offense is a first felony conviction, the offense does not involve circumstances described in (B) of this paragraph, and the victim was

               (i) under 13 years of age, 20 to 30 years;

               (ii) 13 years of age or older, 15 to 30 years;

          (B) if the offense is a first felony conviction and the defendant possessed a firearm, used a dangerous instrument, or caused serious physical injury during the commission of the offense, 25 to 35 years;

          (C) if the offense is a second felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (D) of this paragraph, 25 to 35 years;

          (D) if the offense is a second felony conviction and the defendant has a prior conviction for a sexual felony, 30 to 40 years;

          (E) if the offense is a third felony conviction, the offense does not involve circumstances described in (F) of this paragraph, and the defendant is not subject to sentencing under (l) of this section, 35 to 50 years;

          (F) if the offense is a third felony conviction, the defendant is not subject to sentencing under (l) of this section, and the defendant has two prior convictions for sexual felonies, 99 years;

     (3) sexual assault in the second degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, online enticement of a minor under AS 11.41.452(d), unlawful exploitation of a minor under AS 11.41.455(c)(1), or distribution of child pornography under AS 11.61.125(e)(2) may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 99 years and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155 — 12.55.175:

          (A) if the offense is a first felony conviction, five to 15 years;

          (B) if the offense is a second felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (C) of this paragraph, 10 to 25 years;

          (C) if the offense is a second felony conviction and the defendant has a prior conviction for a sexual felony, 15 to 30 years;

          (D) if the offense is a third felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (E) of this paragraph, 20 to 35 years;

          (E) if the offense is a third felony conviction and the defendant has two prior convictions for sexual felonies, 99 years;

     (4) sexual assault in the third degree, incest, indecent exposure in the first degree, possession of child pornography, distribution of child pornography under AS 11.61.125(e)(1), or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit sexual assault in the second degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, unlawful exploitation of a minor, or distribution of child pornography, may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 99 years and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155 — 12.55.175:

          (A) if the offense is a first felony conviction, two to 12 years;

          (B) if the offense is a second felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (C) of this paragraph, eight to 15 years;

          (C) if the offense is a second felony conviction and the defendant has a prior conviction for a sexual felony, 12 to 20 years;

          (D) if the offense is a third felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (E) of this paragraph, 15 to 25 years;

          (E) if the offense is a third felony conviction and the defendant has two prior convictions for sexual felonies, 99 years.

 (j) A defendant sentenced to a (1) mandatory term of imprisonment of 99 years under (a) of this section may apply once for a modification or reduction of sentence under the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure after serving one-half of the mandatory term without consideration of good time earned under AS 33.20.010, or (2) definite term of imprisonment under (l) of this section may apply once for a modification or reduction of sentence under the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure after serving one-half of the definite term. A defendant may not file and a court may not entertain more than one motion for modification or reduction of a sentence subject to this subsection, regardless of whether or not the court granted or denied a previous motion.

 (k) [Repealed, § 32 ch 2 SLA 2005.] 

 (l) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a defendant convicted of an unclassified or class A felony offense, and not subject to a mandatory 99-year sentence under (a) of this section, shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of 99 years when the defendant has been previously convicted of two or more most serious felonies. If a defendant is sentenced to a definite term under this subsection,

     (1) imprisonment for the prescribed definite term may not be suspended under AS 12.55.080;

     (2) imposition of sentence may not be suspended under AS 12.55.085;

     (3) imprisonment for the prescribed definite term may not be reduced, except as provided in (j) of this section.

 (m) Notwithstanding (a)(4) and (f) of this section, if a court finds that imposition of a mandatory term of imprisonment of 99 years on a defendant subject to sentencing under (a)(4) of this section would be manifestly unjust, the court may sentence the defendant to a definite term of imprisonment otherwise permissible under (a) of this section.

 (n) In imposing a sentence within a presumptive range under (c), (d), (e), or (i) of this section, the total term, made up of the active term of imprisonment plus any suspended term of imprisonment, must fall within the presumptive range, and the active term of imprisonment may not fall below the lower end of the presumptive range.

 (o) [Repealed, § 179 ch. 36 SLA 2016.]

 (p) If the state seeks either (1) the imposition of a sentence under (a) of this section that would preclude the defendant from being awarded a good time deduction under AS 33.20.010(a) based on a fact other than a prior conviction; or (2) to establish a fact that would increase the presumptive sentencing range under (c)(2), (d)(2), (e)(4), (i)(1)(A) or (B), or (i)(2)(A) or (B) of this section, the factual question required to be decided shall be presented to a trial jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt under procedures set by the court, unless the defendant waives trial by jury and either stipulates to the existence of the fact or consents to have the fact proven to the court sitting without a jury. Written notice of the intent to establish a fact under this subsection must be served on the defendant and filed with the court as provided for notice under AS 12.55.155(f)(2).

 (q) Other than for convictions subject to a mandatory 99-year sentence, the court shall impose, in addition to an active term of imprisonment imposed under (i) of this section, a minimum period of (1) suspended imprisonment of five years and a minimum period of probation supervision of 15 years for conviction of an unclassified felony, (2) suspended imprisonment of three years and a minimum period of probation supervision of 10 years for conviction of a class A or class B felony, or (3) suspended imprisonment of two years and a minimum period of probation supervision of five years for conviction of a class C felony. The period of probation is in addition to any sentence received under (i) of this section.

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Our mission is to:

  • Introduce Drug Induced Homicide legislation to Sates that do not currently have this statute.
  • Raise awareness about the effectiveness of criminal investigation and prosecution in reducing deaths related to suspected drug toxicity.
  • Support families of victims who were unlawfully delivered a controlled substance resulting in their death.

Drug Induced Homicide, Inc.® is a registered 501(c) nonprofit organization.

Understanding Drug Induced Homicide Law

From the Attorney General’s point of view.

Read the Brief

For many years, most prosecutors charged only those drug-related deaths involving rival drug gang fights as being homicides. But the focus has now broadened to also examine overdose deaths as prosecutable homicides against those who sold and distributed the drugs causing the overdose. It is important to emphasize that not every death because of a drug overdose is a criminal matter. Some are suicides, and some are simply accidents. But some deaths, legally and ethically, may rise to the level of criminal homicide. These homicides may not be easily discovered, investigated, prosecuted or proven, but they still deserve attention. For that to happen, a paradigm shift in thinking by law enforcement officers and prosecutors is required, away from attitudes focusing on accident to thinking and treating overdoses as homicides.

In order to make that shift, it is important to understand and appreciate the variety of approaches available within existing statutory schemes and case law. While a handful of states have no statutory or case law basis for treating overdose deaths as homicides,[8] the majority already had or have adopted a wide variety of legal theories useful in addressing these cases. Two basic options highlight the differing approaches: use of the existing statutory structure, often referred to as the felony murder rule, and creation of a specific offense of death resulting from the distribution of controlled substances.

What might be characterized as the traditional approach to the matter may be found in those states that have included overdose deaths within their murder statute. Arizona and Oklahoma, among others, list drug offenses as crimes which, when a death occurs during the commission of that offense, is treated as murder.[9] A significant number of states enumerate drug offenses within their murder statutes and, while the laws have been on the books for a considerable time, they are only now being considered for use in overdose cases.

A felony murder statute allows the prosecutor to charge an offense which requires no specific mental state other than that required for the enumerated offense;[10] the law may specifically state that no proof of intent to cause the death is required.[11] In general, proof of the underlying offense and the cause of death will be sufficient to obtain a conviction under this approach. Additional elements, such as proof that the underlying felony must be inherently dangerous to human life,[12] or proof of recklessness in both causation and appreciation or awareness of the risk,[13] may be required in some states.

Where these various felony murder states differ is in their classifications for punishment for the offense. The possibilities range from first degree or capital murder,[14] second degree murder,[15] manslaughter,[16] involuntary manslaughter,[17] and even negligent homicide.[18] They may also limit the application of the statute. For example, Florida’s statute applies only to distribution by an adult,[19] while Colorado’s statute applies only to distribution to a minor on school grounds.[20]

Those states punishing drug dealing resulting in death as a specific offense have adopted a variety of approaches as well. These “drug-induced homicide” statutes are crafted as stand-alone felonies rather than being included in existing murder or other statutes. Again, as with the felony murder alternatives, the treatment of punishment and application may vary. New Hampshire and New Jersey both define the offense as being one of strict liability.[21] Both statutes, mirroring one another, apply to methamphetamine, lysergic acid, diethylamide phencyclidine (PCP), or any other Schedule I and II controlled substances and provides that any person who manufactures, sells, or dispenses the substances in violation of law is strictly liable for a death resulting from their use.

The varieties of these statutes are numerous and diverse. Pennsylvania’s statute applies to any controlled substance and provides that the delivery must be done intentionally.[22] Delaware has imposed a minimum weight threshold to its statute, requiring, for example, that there be delivery of at least one gram or more of heroin.[23] Michigan’s law covers Schedule I and II controlled substances, but specifically excludes marijuana.[24] A recent amendment to the Illinois law allows for prosecution for a death within the state caused by a drug that was delivered outside the state in violation of the law of that other jurisdiction.[25]

For those states, such as California, which have no felony murder or drug-induced homicide statute that would apply to overdose situations, prosecutors are left to cobble together a criminal liability theory using a second degree murder or manslaughter charge with a negligence or reckless element. California might make use of its involuntary manslaughter statute.[26] New York might make use of its statutes regarding criminally negligent homicide (criminal negligence standard) or manslaughter in the second degree (reckless standard).[27] A bill to amend Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute to include causing or contributing to the death of a person as a result of the sale, delivery, or administration of a controlled substance and making it a strict liability offense was introduced but has languished since 2016.[28]

Regardless of the criminal statute scheme, one element is the lynchpin to the crime: causation. Whether a felony murder, strict liability, or reckless or negligent theory, causation raises perhaps the most difficult issues in proving these cases.

Overdose cases have a number of matters that may cause the prosecutor some concern, from lack of sympathy for the victim to proving who provided the drugs. On top of these, many of the victims in overdose death cases are polysubstance abusers, injecting or ingesting a wide variety of both legal and illegal substances. Further, because of their drug addictions, their overall general health may be compromised, making them susceptible to diseases and conditions which might impact the situation leading to their deaths. It becomes imperative for the prosecutor to understand what is needed to prove regarding causation.

States have enumerated a variety of different legal standards for causation of death; “direct result,” “caused by,” “proximately caused,” and “results from” being the more common. Also included are “recklessly causes” and “more likely than not.” Each standard has its own legal ramification. It is important to note, however, that the analysis of proximate causation in tort law is quite different from that analysis applied in criminal law. Mere negligence may suffice in a personal injury case, but not in a criminal matter where gross or wanton disregard is needed to show criminal negligence.

In those states making use of a result-oriented scheme, states may follow the reasoning set forth in the leading federal case on the issue, Burrage v United States.[29] Burrage was prosecuted under the provisions of 21 U. S. C. § 841(b) (1) (C) which provides for punishment in the event that “death or serious bodily injury result[ed] from the use of [the drug].” In Burrage, long-time drug user Banka died following an extended binge that included using heroin purchased from Burrage. At trial, medical experts testified that Bank might have died even if he had not taken the heroin Burrage provided. Denying a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court instructed the jury that the government only had to prove that heroin was a contributing cause of death. The U.S. Supreme Court looked at both actual and proximate cause, holding that, at least where the use of the drug distributed by Burrage was not an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death, he could not be held liable unless such use is a “but-for” cause of death. Thus, under Burrage, a particular drug causing a contributory effect to death is not sufficient to create criminal liability.

This narrow approach to causation makes it especially important that the medical examiner and toxicologist both be consulted prior to initiating a prosecution. Beyond the issue of whether the death is an accident versus a homicide, the medical examiner and toxicologist must understand the legal requirements and what ultimately may be asked of them during testimony in homicide prosecutions such as these. The prosecutor must also understand the distinctions and potential nuances in the medical examiner’s stated cause of death.

Even under a felony murder scheme, often seen as a strict liability situation, causation may still be required. For example, the sole act of selling heroin to a purchaser, who, voluntarily and out of the presence and without the assistance of the seller, subsequently injected heroin and died as a result, may be insufficient to invoke the felony murder rule. In order to convict of felony-murder, it may be necessary in some jurisdictions to show that the conduct causing the death was done while in the commission of a felony or in furtherance of the design to commit the felony.[30] Thus, if the commission of the felony is completed upon the sale, a felony murder charge cannot stand. Nor may the result causation element be ignored even in the strict liability situations. These statutes may still contain a result oriented causation requirement.[31]

Thus, even when not specifically enumerated in the statute, causation remains an essential element. For example, where manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance is the underlying felony relied upon in a felony murder prosecution, the state might still be required to prove (1) the commission or attempt to commit the felony; (2) the defendant’s participation in such felony; and (3) the death of the victim as a result of injuries received during the course of the commission or attempt.[32] Furthermore, the cause of death might not necessarily be the sole cause of death.[33] And where the medical examiner has found that the ingestion of the drug was not the sole cause of death, the prosecutor will face an additional legal hurdle. Thus, in order to make the shift to treating overdose deaths as homicides, it is imperative that investigators and prosecutors find not only the correct legal scheme under which to proceed, but also be mindful of the causation element embedded in a statute or required by a jurisdiction’s case law.

Prosecuting overdose deaths as homicides will not be the silver bullet to the public health crisis this nation faces. However, it is one tool in the law enforcement arsenal which, if used appropriately, can assist locally in focusing on the drug dealers who take advantage of those who have become addicted to opioids.

 

Sources and Works Cited

[1] Ctrs. for Disease Control, Provisional Counts of Drug Overdose Deaths

[2] Illicit Drug Use, Illicit Drug Use Disorders, and Drug Overdose Deaths in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas

[3] The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in 2016: Up 540% in Three Years

[4] The Heroin Epidemic: Then and Now

[5] Heroin Use Rises Significantly Among Young Whites

[6] Why Fentanyl Is So Much More Deadly than Heroin

[7] Counterfeit Prescription Pills Containing Fentanyl: A Global Threat, DEA Intell. Brief

[8] The offense of trafficking a controlled substance by possession with intent to distribute cannot be the predicate felony to a felony murder conviction because it is not an inherently dangerous crime. State v. Bankert, 117 N.M. 614, 975 P.2d 370 (1994).

[9] Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1105 and 21 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 21-701/7.

[10] Alaska Stat. § 11.41.120.

[11] Minn. Stat. § 609.195.

[12] Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1.

[13] Iowa Code § 707.5.

[14] See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1105, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1.

[15] La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.021.

[16] Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 265, § 13.

[17] Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.070.

[18] Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-104.

[19] Fla. Stat. § 782.04(1(a)3.

[20] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-102(e).

[21] N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 318-B:26; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:35-9.

[22] Tit. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2506.

[23] Del. Code Ann .tit 16 § 4752B.

[24] Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.317a.

[25] 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-3.3.

[26] Cal. Penal Code § 192.

[27] N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.10, 125.15.

[28] H.B. 141, 132nd General Assembly.

[29] 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).

[30] See State v. Mauldin, 215 Kan. 956, 529 P.2d 124 (1974)

[31] N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:35-9

[32] See., e.g., State v. Williams, 172 W.Va. 295, 305 S.E.2d 251 (1983)

[33] See State v. Jenkins, 229 W.Va. 415, 729 S.E.2d 250 (2012)